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Abstract 
 
 
According to the existing literature, capital taxes should not be imposed in the presence 
of optimal profit taxation in either unionised or competitive labour markets. We show 
that this conclusion does not hold for an economy with dual labour markets, where the 
competitive wage rate provides the outside option for unionised workers. Even with 
non-distortionary profit taxation it is optimal for such an economy to tax capital if the 
revenue share of capital in the unionised sector is lower than the revenue share of 
capital in the competitive sector. This is because taxing capital income reduces 
employment and lowers the outside option of workers in the unionised sector with the 
latter employment effect being stronger. Moreover, a capital subsidy should be granted 
if the opposite relationship of the revenue shares of capital in the unionised and 
competitive sectors holds. 
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1  Optimal Capital Taxation 
1. Introduction 
A fundamental result in the existing literature on capital income taxation is that small open 
economies should not levy source-based capital taxes if profit taxation is non-restricted. This 
result holds both in economies with competitive labour markets and economies with 
unionised labour markets. In the former case, the optimal tax structures includes profit and 
labour taxes only (cf. e.g. MacDougall 1960, Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991 and for a survey 
and some generalizations in dynamic general equilibrium models, cf. Atkeson, Chari and 
Kehoe 1999). In the latter case, i.e. in economies where the labour markets are imperfect due 
to e.g. bargaining power of the trade unions, a capital tax should not be employed as long as 
profits are high enough so that non-distortive profit taxes can be used to finance public 
expenditures and a wage subsidy to correct for the labour market distortions (cf. Koskela and 
Schöb 2002a and Richter and Schneider 2001). If, however, profit taxation is restricted, it 
may become optimal to levy a positive capital tax to indirectly tax profits when labour 
markets are competitive (Huizinga and Nielsen 1997) and to moderate wages in the presence 
of labour market distortions by affecting the wage elasticity of labour demand via the capital 
tax (Koskela and Schöb 2002a). 
It is tempting to conclude from these well-established results that when capital tax 
should not be levied in either an economy with a perfectly competitive or an imperfect labour 
market, it should not be levied in economies with dual labour markets, where some sectors 
exhibit competitive labour markets and some unionised labour markets. This paper, however, 
shows a new result according to which this conclusion does not hold if these two types of 
labour markets are interrelated in such a way that if workers can be employed in both sectors, 
the competitive wage rate provides the outside option for unionised workers.1 A marginal 
introduction of a capital tax reduces employment directly in the unionised sector because 
labour and capital are price complements. While such a marginal introduction of a capital tax 
                                                 
1 For an analysis and discussion of the determinants of outside options, cf. Blanchard and Katz (1997). 
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does not distort the competitive labour market, it reduces the outside option for workers in the 
unionised sector. This will moderate wage formation and thereby boost employment and 
output in the unionised sector and improve social welfare – as long as the revenue share of 
capital in the unionised sector is lower than the cost (= revenue) share of capital in the 
competitive sector. A capital subsidy should be granted if the opposite relationship between 
the revenue shares of capital in the unionised and competititve sector holds. In that case the 
indirect positive effect of the capital tax rate via the outside option is smaller than the direct 
negative effect so that subsidizing capital income will improve social welfare. 
The main objective of the paper is to identify and elaborate the tax incidence when the 
the two labour markets are interrelated. Therefore, we abstract from all other well-known 
reasons that would require a non-zero capital tax rate in a second-best optimal tax framework. 
Thus, we (i) consider a small open economy that cannot influence the terms-of-trade, (ii) do 
not impose any restrictions on profit taxation so that the government can always rely on non-
distortionary taxes and (iii) assume Cobb-Douglas production technologies to eliminate the 
effects, factor taxation can have on wage formations by altering the wage elasticity of labour 
demand. We proceed as follows: section 2 outlines the model, while section 3 derives the 
main result concerning the optimal structure of factor taxes in the presence of unrestricted 
non-distortionary profit taxation. Our findings are briefly summarized in the final section 4. 
2. The model 
We consider a small open economy where there is one unionised sector and one competitive 
sector. The unionised sector produces the good uY  that is sold on the world market at given 
world market price, which is normalized to unity. Output is produced with three inputs, 
capital uK , labour  and a third fixed input, whose income is considered as profit (or rent).uL 2 
To focus on the effects tax rate changes have on the cost side of production, we assume a 
constant profit share so that the Cobb-Douglas production function exhibits decreasing 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, we can assume that the unionised sector generates profit due to monopolistic competition in the 
goods market, see e.g. Koskela and Schöb 2002b. 
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returns to scale in capital and labour, 
 ( ) ε−−⋅= 11)1()()( susuu KLY . (1) 
where  describes the degree of decreasing returns to scale. Consequently, 1>ε ε1  denotes the 
constant profit share,  the cost share of labour and s ε−ε )1(s  the revenue share of labour, 
respectively. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile between countries, while labour is 
mobile only between the two sectors within the economy. The firm maximizes profits 
whereby it considers the gross factor prices r~  and uw~  as given. The gross interest rate r~  
consists of the net-of-tax interest rate and a source-based capital tax, i.e. rtr r )1(~ +=  with  
denoting the uniform capital tax rate and r the (constant) world interest rate. The gross wage 
rt
uw~  is the net-of-tax wage , which is negotiated between the trade union and the firm, plus 
the labour tax, i.e. 
uw
u
w
u wtw )1(~ += , with  denoting the uniform labour tax rate.  wt
All N workers of the economy are represented by a labour union which maximizes its 
N members’ net-of-tax income. The net-of-tax wage rate of a working member in the 
unionised sector is . The outside option is to work in the competitive sector where the net-
of-tax wage rate is given by . The objective function for the trade union can thus be 
expressed as: 
uw
w
 ) . (2) (* uuu LNwLwV −+=
The wage rate is determined in a bargaining process between the labour union and the firm 
and the firm then unilaterally determines employment. This ‘right-to-manage’ approach 
represents the outcome of the bargaining by an asymmetric Nash bargaining. The fall-back 
position of the labour union is given by , i.e. if the negotiations break down, all 
members will work in the competitive labour sector. Assuming a small labour union, the 
outside option is constant. The fall-back position of the firm is given by zero profits, i.e. 
. Using , the Nash bargaining maximand can be written as 
wNV =0
00 =π 0* VVV −≡
 , (3) β−βπ=Ω 1V
with β representing the relative bargaining power of the labour union. The first-order 
condition with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate is 
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 0)1(0 =π
πβ−+β⇔=Ω www V
V . (4) 
Solving the first-order condition (4) explicitly under the assumptions made, we obtain: 
 mw
s
ww u
wL
u
wL
u
wL
u
wLu ≡−ε
β+=η+β−+η+β
η+β−+βη=
)1(
1
)1)(1()1(
)1)(1(
~,~,
:~,~, , (5) 
where  denotes the mark-up between the negotiated and competitive net-of-tax wage 
rates. It is constant as the definition of the wage elasticity of labour demand, 
1>m
)1(1~~~, ε−+−=≡η sLwLwu wL , shows that  is constant in the case of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function (1) (cf. Koskela and Schöb 2002b for an explicit derivation). The union-
non-union wage differential can be written as 
u
wL ~,η
 .0
)1(
1/)( >−ε
β=−=−=
s
mwwwd u  
Hence, the net-of-tax wage  as well as the gross wage rate are proportional to the 
net-of-tax wage rate and the gross wage rate, respectively, in the competitive sector. 
uw uw wt )1( +
In the competitive sector, the representative firm produces the good Y , the price of 
which is also normalized to unity, with capital K  and labour  as the only two inputs. The 
production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, i.e. we 
have  
L
 )1( σσ −⋅= KLY , (6) 
where  denotes the cost share of labour and σ )1( σ−  the cost share of capital in the 
competitive sector. Profits are zero in the competitive sector, because this sector is not 
unionised. The price of capital is the same as in the unionised sector, while the net of-tax 
wage  is determined by the equilibrium condition in the competitive labour market. As all 
N workers in the economy prefer to work in the unionised sector as the net-of-tax wage rate 
exceeds the net-of-tax wage rate in the competitive labour market, the labour supply in the 
competitive sector is given by  and the net-of tax wage rate  is determined by the 
equilibrium condition 
w
uLN − w
)~,~()~,~( rwLNrwL uu−= . 
To determine the effects, factor taxes have on the-net-of-tax wage rate and the gross 
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wage rate in the competitive sector, we make use of the cost function associated with the 
production function (6), that is YrwYrwcYrwC σ−σ−σσ− σ−σ== 11 ~~)1()~,~(),~,~( , where )~,~( rwc  
denotes the constant unit cost of production and thereby the marginal cost as well. As profit 
maximization requires 1)~,~( =rwc , the impact of factor taxes on the net-of-tax wage rate can 
be described as follows: 
 0
)1(
<+−=≡ wtw t
ww
dt
dw
w
 (7) 
and 
 0
)1(
)1( <+σ
σ−−=≡
r
t
r t
ww
dt
dw
r
. (8) 
A higher labour tax decreases the net-of-tax wage rate in the competitive sector such that the 
gross wage rate remains constant. A higher capital tax also reduces the net-of-tax wage rate 
such that both marginal and unit cost remain constant. Naturally, the precise reduction 
depends on the cost shares of capital and labour. 
The government is assumed to require a fixed amount of tax revenues to finance the 
public good G. It can levy a profit tax , a labour tax  on wage income and a source-based 
tax on domestic capital input , so that the government budget constraint is given by 
πt wt
rt
 . (9) GKKrtwLLwtt ur
uu
w
u =++++ππ )()(
To focus only on the efficiency aspects of the tax structure, we assume linear preferences and 
define the total surplus as the social welfare function (cf. Summers, Gruber and Vergara 
1993). The total surplus consists of the net-of-tax wage income equal to , which 
accrues to workers, and the net-of-tax profit income . As we hold G constant we 
suppress the term G in the total surplus function. Furthermore, the income from the domestic 
capital stock is also assumed to be constant and therefore is not explicitly considered in the 
welfare function either. All domestic profits go to domestic capitalists.
wLLw uu +
ut π− π )1(
3 Hence, the social 
welfare function is given by 
                                                 
3 For an analysis when foreigners receive a fraction of domestic profits, see Huizinga and Nielsen (1997). 
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 . (10) uuu twLLwS π−++= π )1(
3. The optimal tax structure 
The government is supposed to commit to the choice of an optimal tax structure by choosing 
tax rates so as to maximize social welfare (10) subject to the government’s budget constraint 
(9) and to wage and employment determination in both the unionised and competitive sector. 
Defining λ as the Lagrange multiplier for the government budget constraint, the first order 
condition for the profit tax  is: πt
 1, (11) 0 =λ⇔=λπ+π− uu
which shows that the optimal profit tax is non-distortionary. Moreover, and importantly, using 
the wage bargaining equation (5) for the unionised labour market, the first-order condition 
with respect to the labour tax rate  can be written as follows wt
 [ ] [ ] 0)1()()1(0 =λ++−+λ++λ⇔=Λ
www tw
u
tw
u
t wtwLNwtwmL , (12) 
where  describes the Lagrangian function. Utilizing equation (7) it can easily be shown that 
(12) also requires . Thus, the labour tax rate is as good as the profit tax to finance public 
expenditures efficiently, i.e. both taxes are non-distortionary in our framework. There are two 
reasons for this interesting finding. First, the labour tax rate in the competitive sector does 
only affect the net-of-tax wage of a fixed factor because the labour supply is exogenously 
determined by the unionised sector’s labour demand. Second, as the gross wage rate in the 
unionised sector is proportional to the gross wage rate in the competitive sector, the labour tax 
does not affect the outcome of the unionised sector either. This is an application of a well-
known neutrality result by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) (see p. 108) according to 
which labour taxes do not affect the outcome in the unionised sector if the outside option is 
proportional to the net-of-tax wage paid in the unionised sector. 
Λ
1=λ
Of course, under our assumptions the labour tax rate is non-distortionary in both the 
unionised and competitive sector only if total labour supply in the economy is fixed. If we 
relax this assumption by endogenising the labour-leisure choice of workers, this result would 
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vanish as it would affect total employment. Nevertheless, the qualitative result concerning the 
allocation of labour between the two sectors would be unaffected. However, it may be 
affected by a non-linear labour tax. We will refer back to the implication this would have in 
our concluding remarks. 
Next we turn to the optimal capital tax rate. According to the existing literature, the 
capital tax rate should always be zero if non-distortionary taxes are available. The question is, 
whether this result holds if unionised and competitive labour markets both exist in an 
economy and are interrelated because the competitive wage rate is the outside option for the 
trade union that negotiates the wage rate in the unionised sector.  
Maximizing the Lagrangian with respect to  when rt 1=λ , gives the following 
formula for the optimal capital tax rate  
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −σ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
σ
−ε−ε+σ
σ−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ σ−ε+ε
−εε−
=
)()1()1(
1)1()1(
s
s
m
L
N
sm
t
u
r . (13) 
(see Appendix 1 for a detailed derivation of equation (13)). For a positive mark-up the 
denominator is always positive if 
)1( >m
s−σ  is positive. Furthermore, and importantly, it can also 
be shown that the denominator is always positive under some additional but rather weak 
assumptions about the magnitude of m in the case when s−σ  is negative. More precisely, we 
have  
 0)()1()1(
)(
)1(11 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −σ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
σ
−ε−ε+σ
σ−⇒⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
σ−
−⋅ε+σ< ss
m
L
N
s
ssm u  (14) 
(see Appendix 2). For instance, if the profit share ε1  in the unionized sector is 10 %, i.e. 
, any union-nonunion wage differential 10=ε 1−m  being less than 40 % provides a sufficient 
condition for a positive denominator. This assumption about the union-nonunion wage 
differential lies in conformity with empirical studies (for surveys, see Booth (1995) and Lewis 
(1986)). Thus, we can conclude that the sign of the capital tax rate is given by the sign of the 
numerator. 
As we show in Appendix 1 (see Equation (A3)), the sign of the numerator is equal to 
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the )~(sign ~~ mwLrL
rt
u
w
u
r +  that describes the employment effect of the capital tax rate in the 
unionised sector. We can see immediately that if the cost share of labour in the unionised 
sector s exceeds the cost share of labour in the competitive sector σ, then the optimal tax 
structure requires a positive capital tax rate. As the numerator of (13) increases in the 
difference  while the denominator decreases, the optimal tax structure is given by  )( s−σ
  σ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<=
>
ε+ε
−ε⇔⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<=
> 1)1(0 str . (15) 
In equation (15) the left-hand side is equal to the revenue share of labour, which is ε−ε )1(  
times the cost share of labour , plus the profit share in the unionised sector s ε1 . These are 
the two income shares in the unionised sector that affect social welfare. The right-hand side 
denotes the cost share of labour in the competitive sector. This is the only non-capital income 
share in the competitive sector. Thus even in the presence of optimal non-distortionary profit 
tax the capital tax rate should be positive if the welfare-relevant income component increases 
due to the introduction of a capital tax. 
To derive the intuition for this result, we rewrite (15) as the condition for the sign of 
the capital tax rate in terms of the revenue share of capital: 
 )1()1()1(0 σ−
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
>
=
<
ε
−ε−⇔
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<
=
>
str . (16) 
The optimal capital tax condition (16) can be summarized as 
PROPOSITION: The optimal tax structure in an economy, where are no restrictions on 
profit taxation, requires a positive capital tax rate if the revenue share of capital in 
the unionised sector is lower than the cost (= revenue) share of capital in the 
competitive sector. A capital subsidy should be granted if the opposite relationship 
holds. 
To provide an interpretation, notice first that the allocation of workers between sectors is 
determined in the unionised sector because the negotiated wage rate determines labour 
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demand in this sector. A capital tax reduces employment in the unionised sector because 
labour and capital are price complements, i.e. . This effect is the larger, the larger the 
revenue share of capital is. In the competitive sector, the capital tax rate will lead to a fall in 
the net-of-tax wage rate so that marginal cost remains constant. The fall in the net-of-tax 
wage rate in the competitive sector is the larger, the larger the cost share of capital is in this 
sector. As this affects the outside option of the trade union, the effect countervails the direct 
effect of a change in the capital tax rate on employment in the unionised sector as it will lead 
trade unions to moderate wages. As the proposition shows, the direct effect of the capital tax 
rate is dominated by the indirect wage moderation effect if the revenue share of capital in the 
unionised sector is lower than in the competitive sector. Hence, capital should be taxed. But if 
the direct effect dominates the indirect wage moderation effect, then capital should be 
subsidised. 
0~ <urL
The proposition implies that if a capital tax can shift labour from the competitive to 
the unionised sector, social welfare will increase. The direct effect is obvious. Those workers 
who find a job in the unionised sector are better off as their wage increases. As we can apply 
the envelope theorem for the marginal introduction of the capital tax, we can see that the 
income loss of workers in the competitive sector is compensated by the tax revenues from the 
marginal capital tax rate. In the unionised sector profits will rise by the same amount as tax 
revenues plus the income loss of incumbent workers. Thus the only welfare relevant effect is 
the income rise of those workers who change sectors. More precisely, the relationship 
between the social welfare and a marginal introduction of capital income tax can be presented 
as follows (see Appendix 3 for details) 
 wm
dt
dLS
r
u
rt )1( −= . (17) 
4. Concluding remarks 
The existing literature has demonstrated that in the presence of unrestricted profit taxes, 
source-based capital taxes should not be employed in either an economy with competitive 
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labour market or an economy with unionised labour market. We demonstrate in this paper that 
this result does not carry over to the case of an economy where both types of labour markets 
exist and are interrelated so that the competitive wage rate determines the outside option for 
unionised workers and where there is a uniform labour tax rate in competitive and unionised 
labour markets. More precisely, our new proposition shows that the relative revenue shares of 
capital in the unionised and competitive sector are essential in determining whether a capital 
tax or capital subsidy should be levied even in the presence of optimal profit taxation. 
Of course, our main result is derived under strict assumptions about the technology in 
the two sectors. These strong assumptions were made because the aim of the paper was to 
isolate an effect that, to our knowledge, has not yet been discussed in the literature. By 
eliminating all effects that may affect the optimal capital tax rate and have already been 
identified in the literature, we were able to focus on an important effect capital taxes will have 
in an economy where parts of the labour markets are unionised while other parts are 
competitive. In such a dual labour markets economy, the capital tax rate normally affects the 
allocation of labour between sectors by changing the outside option in the unionised sector 
labour market via its impact on the wage rate in competitive labour market. It is desirable 
from a welfare point of view to employ more labour in the unionised sector as the marginal 
productivity of labour in the unionised sector is higher than in the competitive sector. Hence, 
a capital tax or capital subsidy can be used to reallocate labour when other tax instruments fail 
to do so. This is the case with labour taxes when the technology in the unionised sector is 
Cobb-Douglas. This result is very much in line with the general finding in the literature 
according to which changes in the tax structure will affect unemployment only if these 
changes allow the government to shift the tax burden away from unionised labour (cf. 
Bovenberg 2003). In this particular case, tax policy works by shifting the threat point of the 
trade union in the wage bargaining process. 
Finally, we would like to mention two areas for further research. First, having 
identified a potentially important effect, the capital tax can play, we could ask in how far this 
effect can be dealt with by applying other tax instruments, e.g. a non-linear labour tax. Of 
 
11  Optimal Capital Taxation 
course, the existence of a non-linear income tax may allow us to treat labour differently in the 
framework presented here. However, the tax system may allow for different income tax rates 
for different incomes but it does not so for different sector-specific features of the labour 
market. We can thus expect that there are restrictions concerning the application of non-linear 
labour taxes in order to deal with the reallocation of labour and capital taxes may be still 
necessary to raise efficiency. It is a subject to further research to analyse to what extent 
capital taxes may be used in dual labour markets to reallocate labour when more complex tax 
systems are considered. 
Second, apart from the allocative effects, a welfare-improving introduction of either a 
capital tax or a capital subsidy, depending on the relative size of the revenue shares of capital, 
will also have distributive consequences in the case of heterogenous agents. As we have 
identified the unionised sector as the one where profits are present and thus rent-sharing is 
possible, a welfare-improving introduction of a capital tax will hurt workers as their income 
goes down while benefiting the recipients of profit income. 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the optimal capital tax formula 
Maximizing social welfare (10) subject to government budget constraint (9) and wage and 
employment determination in the unionised and competitive sectors when the marginal cost of 
public funds is equal to one allows us to write the Lagrangian function as   
 uur
r
ruu rKt
t
tLNwLwm πσ
σ
λ +++
+−+=Λ = )1()(
~~
1 . (A1) 
Differentiating (A1) with respect to  gives the first-order condition rt
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Reformulating, using (8) yields 
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Using the factor demand elasticities , , 
,  (for details cf. Koskela and Schöb 2002b), we can 
write: 
)1(1~, ε−+−=η su wL )1)(1(~, ε−−=η su rL
)1)(1(1~, ε−−+−=η su rK )1(~, ε−=η su wK
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and 
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Substituting (A4) and (A5) into (A3) yields: 
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where εσ−+−ε≡ 1)1(sX . Thus we have  
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Factoring out with respect to , we end up with equation rt
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. (A6) 
Substituting the definition of X into the first-order condition (A6) and reformulating gives 
equation (13) of the text. 
Appendix 2: Sufficient conditions for positive denominator of equation (13) 
Case A: 0 . A sufficient condition for the positive denominator is that the term )( >−σ s
[ σ−ε−ε )1(sm ] is also positive so that 0)1( >−ε−εσ sm . Using this condition, we have 
smsssmsm +−ε=−ε−ε>−ε−εσ )1()1()1( . As , it follows immediately that 
. 
1>m
0)1( >−ε−εσ sm
Case B: . Let us first rewrite the denominator as follows 0)( <−σ s
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so that the sign of the denominator is the same as the sign of the terms in the right-hand side 
square brackets. Furthermore, applying 0)( <−σ s , we can write: 
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)1(
222
222
sssssmms
sssssmms
L
N
u
−σ+ε+σε−εσ−εσ+σ−>
−σ+ε+σε−εσ−εσ+σ−
 
Thus, if the right-hand-side is positive, the denominator is also positive: 
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 . 0)()()1(222 >σ−ε+−σεσ+−=−ε+σε−εσ−εσ+ sssmssssssmms
For , we know that 0)( <−σ s 0)( <−σσ s  and 0)( >σ−ss . Thus, the denominator is 
positive in case B as long as 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
σ−
−⋅ε+σ< )(
)1(11
s
ssm . (A7) 
The term in brackets exceeds unity. Assuming that ε  is a finite number, i.e. monopoly power 
does exist, a small difference between s and σ  makes the term in brackets very large while a 
larger difference let the first term increase. 
Appendix 3: The social welfare effect of a marginal introduction of a capital 
tax 
Differentiating social welfare (10), and assuming 0== wr tt , we obtain 
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u
rt
u
w
u
r
uu
rtrt t
ttwmmwLrLLNmLwS ππ ππ
0
~~ )1()1)(~()(
=∂
∂+++−++−+= . (A8) 
Using (8) and (A4), differentiating the budget constraint (9) with respect to the capital tax and 
applying  
 mwLrKmwr uu
rt
u
w
u
rrt
~1~~~ σ
σπππ −+−=+= , (A9) 
we can rewrite (A6), using σσ )1( −=wLrK  
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 (A10) 
which gives equation (16) of the text. 
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